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Research into risk communication has commonly highlighted 
the disparity between the meaning intended by the 
communicator and what is understood by the recipient.  Such 
miscommunications will have implications for perceived trust 
and expertise of the communicator, but it is not known whether 
this differs according to the communication format. We 
examined the effect of using verbal, numerical and mixed 
communication formats on perceptions of credibility and 
correctness, as well as whether they influenced a decision to 
evacuate, both before and after an ‘erroneous’ prediction (i.e. 
an ‘unlikely’ event occurs, or a ‘likely’ event does not occur). 
We observed no effect of communication format on any of the 
measures pre-outcome, but found the numerical format was 
perceived as less incorrect, as well as more credible than the 
other formats after an ‘erroneous’ prediction, but only when 
low probability expressions were used. Our findings suggest 
numbers should be used in consequential risk communications. 
 
Keywords: verbal probability expressions; numerical 
probabilities; risk communication; trust; expertise; credibility 
Introduction 
Science is suffering from a ‘crisis of trust’ (House of Lords, 
2000); preserving and cultivating the public’s trust has never 
been more important for the scientific community (Nature, 
2010). Uncertainty is an inescapable part of any scientific 
endeavour, but the presence of it creates doubt in the minds 
of the public and it is often used as a reason to delay taking 
action (Lewandowsky, Ballard, & Pancost, 2015).  
Effectively communicating information regarding risk and 
uncertainty thus represents a significant problem for 
scientists.  
Methods for communicating risk and uncertainty include 
using verbal probability expressions (VPEs; e.g. ‘possible’, 
‘likely’), numerical expressions (e.g. ‘20% likelihood’), or 
mixed expressions (e.g. ‘unlikely [20% likelihood]’). 
Budescu and Wallsten (1995) proposed that the choice of 
format for communicating likelihood information should be 
governed by the congruence principle: the precision of the 
communication should be consistent with the degree of 
certainty that can reasonably be expected for estimates about 
the event described. Much research has investigated the 
pitfalls of using VPEs to communicate uncertainty using the 
‘how likely’ translation approach, whereby people are asked 
to translate a VPE to a corresponding numerical probability 
This has highlighted the variability in people’s usage and 
interpretations (e.g., Budescu & Wallsten, 1985), as well as 
the influence of other contextual and cultural factors (e.g., 
Bonnefon & Villejoubert, 2006; Harris & Corner, 2011; 
Harris, Corner, Xu, & Du, 2013; Teigen & Brun, 1999, 2003; 
Weber & Hilton, 1990). Such variability clearly highlights 
the potential for a reduction in perceived credibility of the 
communicator, if there is a disparity between the meaning 
intended by the communicator and that which is understood 
by the recipient. 
A commonly suggested solution to the problems of 
miscommunication is to use a dual-scale, mixed format 
expression to communicate risk and uncertainty, for example 
‘It is unlikely (less than 33%)’ (e.g., Budescu, Broomell, & 
Por, 2009; Budescu, Por, Broomell, & Smithson, 2014; 
Harris & Corner, 2011; Harris et al., 2013; Patt & Dessai, 
2005; Witteman & Renooij, 2003). Using such a ‘verbal-
numerical’ (V-N) format was found to increase 
correspondence between people’s interpretations and the 
IPCC guidelines, an effect that replicated across 24 countries 
(Budescu et al., 2014). However, when shown a histogram of 
potential outcomes and asked to complete probability 
statements (e.g., “It is unlikely that the lava flow will extend 
to a distance of __km”), the so-called ‘which outcome’ 
approach to studying VPEs (e.g.,  Teigen, Juanchich, & 
Riege, 2013), participants tended to complete the sentence 
with a distance that exceeded any represented in the 
histogram, both for ‘unlikely’ and ‘unlikely (20% chance)’ 
(Jenkins, Harris, & Lark, 2016; see also Juanchich & Sirota, 
2016). If such phrases are seen as appropriate for 
communicating an outcome with a 0% chance of occurring, 
the mismatch between this and an intended communication 
of ‘20% likelihood’ could adversely affect confidence in 
subsequent communications. 
Aside from the terms used, a further problem arises from 
people’s general understanding of uncertainty and 
probability. Uncertainty is often perceived by the public as an 
‘indicator of ignorance’, when in fact it should be seen as a 
source of actionable knowledge (Lewandowsky et al., 2015). 
Scientific forecasts are probabilistic (at best) and thus it is, 
for example, not possible to predict with certainty the 
probability of a volcanic eruption on a given day. Even if an 
event is predicted to be ‘likely’ to occur, the very fact it is not 
certain means that it might still not happen. In the same vein, 
even if an event is predicted as ‘unlikely’ to occur (e.g. 20% 
likelihood; Theil, 2002), it does not mean the event will 
definitely not occur, given that one in five times it will (on a 
frequentist interpretation of probability). The expectation of 
what will happen is largely driven by the directionality of the 
expression (Teigen & Brun, 1995, 1999); in that phrases 
which have negative directionality (e.g. ‘unlikely’) focus 
one’s attention on the non-occurrence of the event, whereas 
those with positive directionality (e.g. ‘likely’) focus on the 
occurrence of the event. If the outcome is ‘opposite’ to what 
was predicted, the predictions are often seen as ‘erroneous’, 
which could have a knock-on effect on perceived credibility.  
Despite recent calls to use a dual-scale communication 
format, research has yet to explore the effect of using mixed 
expressions on the perceived credibility of the communicator. 
Neither, perhaps more importantly, has it investigated the 
consequences of ‘erroneous’ predictions on credibility. Given 
a major function of risk communication is providing 
trustworthy information, confidence in the source of the 
information is key (Kasperson, 2014).  After all, even if the 
information is understood as intended, it is of no use if the 
communicator is not perceived as credible and thus is not 
trusted enough to inspire action on the basis of the 
communication. Indeed, credibility has been found to 
influence risk perceptions. Trust is negatively associated with 
perceived risk (Sjöberg, 2001), as well as directly affecting 
behaviour (Wachinger, Renn, Begg, & Kuhlicke, 2013). 
Longman, Turner, King, & McCaffery (2012) explored the 
effect of numerical formats on accuracy of understanding, 
perceived risk, and source credibility judgements for two 
different sources of risk information (clinician / 
pharmaceutical company). The risk estimate was presented 
either as a either a point (20 out of 100), small range (16 – 24 
out of 100) or large range (8 – 32 out of 100). Range 
information resulted in reduced understanding and the large 
range was perceived as more risky compared to a point 
estimate. Experts using point estimates were viewed as more 
credible. Gurmankin, Baron and Armstrong (2004) 
investigated the effect of verbal and numerical statements of 
risk (percentage / fraction) on trust and comfort in a physician 
in a hypothetical medical communication. They found 
subjects were more trusting of, and more comfortable with, 
numerical versions of the information, though this effect 
decreased with lowering levels of numeracy, highlighting the 
importance of including a numeracy measure in the current 
study.  
The importance of investigating the credibility of the 
communicator cannot be understated. Whilst an accurate 
understanding of information is clearly desirable, it is 
people’s actions (on the basis of the communication) which 
matter, given they will have the most consequences for the 
individual. Therefore an investigation into the effects of 
communication format should also consider the effect of 
communication format on people’s actions.  Doyle, McClure, 
Paton, & Johnston (2014) found that fewer people suggested 
evacuating when the risk of a volcanic eruption was described 
using verbal terms than when using numerically equivalent 
terms, suggested to be a result of the fact that VPEs are  
viewed as more ambiguous, though again the study did not 
consider mixed-formats, or the influence of ‘erroneous’ 
predictions.  
Although previous research has demonstrated the V-N 
format aids understanding in risk communications (Budescu 
et al., 2014), it may not be the preferred format for the 
recipient. Indeed, there may be a discrepancy between what 
people favour (for instance the preference for receiving 
information in numerical form, Erev & Cohen, 1990) and 
what experts can suitably provide. Using a numerical point 
estimate (e.g. 15%) to describe the chance of a natural hazard 
(which are, by nature, highly uncertain) might be perceived 
as overly precise according to the congruence principle 
(Budescu & Wallsten, 1995) and thus not credible. 
A deeper understanding of the effects of using different 
communication formats and the consequences of ‘erroneous’ 
predictions is therefore clearly required, such that the public’s 
trust in science can be built and maintained. We thus sought 
to examine whether initial perceptions of credibility in the 
communicator differed according to communication format 
over two studies featuring low and high probability events. 
We also investigated whether these perceptions changed after 
an ‘erroneous’ prediction (i.e. the ‘unlikely’ outcome 
occurred, in Study 1, or the ‘likely’ outcome did not occur, in 
Study 2). Ascertaining the effect of these factors is instructive 




300 Native English speakers (146 male) aged between 18 – 
72 (Mdn= 33.5) were recruited from Prolific Academic (PA; 
www.prolific.ac). Participants received £0.75 for 
participating.  
Design 
A 4 × 2 mixed design was used. Communication format was 
in the low probability domain and had four levels, 
manipulated between participants: verbal- “unlikely”, 
numerical- “20% likelihood”, V-N- “unlikely (20% 
likelihood)” and N-V- “20% likelihood (unlikely).” Outcome 
(pre/post) was a within-participants variable.  
Perceptions of trust, expertise, correctness and decision to 
evacuate were rated on five-point scales. Expertise was 
operationalised as ‘How knowledgeable does the expert 
seem?’ from 1 – ‘Not at all knowledgeable’ to 5 – ‘Extremely 
knowledgeable’. Trust was operationalised as ‘How much do 
you trust that the expert is giving you complete and unbiased 
information?’ (Dieckmann, Slovic, & Peters, 2009), from 1 – 
‘Not at all’ to 5 – ‘A great deal’. Decision to evacuate, based 
on Doyle et al. (2014), was rated from 1– ‘Definitely should 
evacuate today’ to 5 – ‘Definitely should not evacuate today’. 
Participants also then had to indicate why they made that 
decision. Correctness was rated from 1 – ‘Not at all correct’ 
to 5 – ‘Completely correct’.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
After consenting to participate, participants indicated their 
age, gender and Prolific ID before reading the introductory 
text. The introductory text informed participants that they 
would see a geological scenario and be asked to make a series 
of judgements about this. On the next screen, participants 
read a vignette about a current volcanic eruption, in which 
lava flows were expected. A volcanologist presented a 
communication about the probability of the lava flows 
travelling a certain distance: 
“Mount Ablon has a history of explosive eruptions that 
have produced lava flows. An eruption is currently 
underway and lava flows are expected. Volcanologists 
from Ablon Geological Centre are communicating 
information about the volcano. A volcanologist has 
suggested that, given the volcano’s recent history, there 
is a 20% likelihood (unlikely) that the lava flow will 
extend 3.5km from the point of eruption.” 
Participants then provided initial ratings of expertise and 
trust in the expert’s prediction of events. On the subsequent 
screen, participants were informed that the capital city was at 
risk of the volcanic eruption and asked to rate whether to 
evacuate the city today or not (Doyle et al., 2014). A mass 
evacuation was described as being ‘very expensive and 
extremely disruptive to residents’. 
    Participants were then informed on the following screen 
that the unlikely outcome did in fact occur. They were asked 
to provide further trust and expertise ratings, as well as rating 
how correct the volcanologist’s prediction was in light of the 
outcome. The next screen then showed a similar 
communication by a volcanologist about Mount Ablon, set 
two years on, with participants asked the two evacuation 
questions, as before.  
Finally participants completed a numeracy scale (Lipkus, 
Samsa, & Rimer, 2001), with two additional questions from 
the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, 
& Garcia-Retamero, 2012) included to increase variability in 
scores, given previous studies using PA have found it to be a 
highly numerate sample. After completing the study, 
participants were given a code to claim their reward, thanked 
and debriefed. 
Results 
There was a significant correlation between trust and 
expertise ratings, both pre-outcome, r = .69, p < .001 and 
post-outcome, r = .74, p < .001. For ease of exposition, we 
averaged the measures to create a single measure of 
credibility. The data were entered into a 4 (communication 
format) × 2 (outcome) × 2 (numeracy) ANOVA, unless stated 
otherwise. 
Given the highly skewed distribution of responses, 
participants with scores of eight or under were classed as low 
numeracy and those with nine or above classed as high 
numeracy. However, given there was only one effect of (or 
interaction involving) numeracy across Studies 1 and 2, this 
variable is only considered further in that single instance. 
Credibility Ratings 
Mean credibility ratings, by communication format, are 
plotted in Figure 1, which suggests that pre-outcome there 
was little difference between formats. All communication 
formats suffered from a loss of perceived credibility post-
outcome, but there was less of a reduction in the numerical 
format. Correspondingly, there was a main effect of outcome, 
F (1, 292) = 218.60, p < .001, η𝑝
2= .43, and format, F (3, 292) 
= 5.77, p < .01, η𝑝
2= .06, but this was qualified by a significant 
interaction between outcome and format, F (3, 292) = 6.87, p 
< .001, η𝑝
2= .07. Simple effects analyses confirmed no effect 
of format pre-outcome F (3, 296) = 0.38, p =.77, and a 
significant effect of format post-outcome F (3, 292) = 8.02, p 
< .001. It is worth noting, however, that the reduction in 
credibility was still significant even in the numerical 




Figure 1. Effect of Communication Format on Perceptions 
of Credibility Before and After an ‘Erroneous’ Prediction 
(Error Bars Represent 1−
+ SE) – Study 1 – Low Probability. 
Decision to Evacuate 
Mean evacuation ratings both pre- and post-outcome, by 
communication format, are displayed in Table 1, which 
shows a slight difference between communication formats 
prior to the outcome. Post-outcome, there was a shift to being 
more certain about evacuating today. There was a main effect 
of outcome, F (1, 292) = 98.19, p < .001, η𝑝
2= .25 and format, 
F (3, 292) = 5.59, p < .01, η𝑝
2= .05. Participants were more 
certain about evacuating today in the verbal condition and 
least certain decision in the N-V condition. There were no 
significant interactions (all ps > .12). 
 
Correctness Ratings 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of 
communication format on correctness ratings, F (3, 292) = 
26.32, p < .001, η𝑝
2= .22, corresponding to the differences in 
the credibility ratings. From Table 1, the numerical format 
was seen as ‘least incorrect’ and the verbal format seen as 




































299 Native English speakers were recruited from Amazon 
MTurk. 17 cases were removed for failing the attention 
check, leaving a final sample of 281 participants (138 male) 
aged between 18 – 74 (Mdn= 32). Participants received 
$0.60 for participating. 
Design, Materials and Procedure 
As in Study 1, except communication format was set in the 
high probability domain: verbal – “likely”, numerical – “80% 
likelihood”, V-N – “likely (80% likelihood)” and N-V– “80% 
likelihood (likely)”. In addition, post-outcome, the likely 
event did not occur. 
Results 
Trust and expertise ratings were again correlated (pre-
outcome: r = .60, p < .001; post-outcome: r = .74, p < .001). 
We combined the two measures as in Study 1. The data were 
analysed as in Study 1. 
Credibility Ratings 
Mean credibility ratings, by communication format, are 
plotted in Figure 2, which shows before the outcome there 
was little difference between formats, as in Study 1. Post-
outcome, all communication formats suffered from a loss of 
perceived credibility, with no notable difference between 
formats. The outcome and format interaction of Study 1 was 
not replicated, F (3, 273) = 2.53, p = .06. The main effect of 
outcome was significant, F (1, 273) = 221.23, p < .001, η𝑝
2= 
.45, and the effect of format was marginally significant, F (3, 
273) = 2.59, p = .053, η𝑝
2= .03. A post-hoc Gabriel test 
revealed there were no significant differences between 
formats (all ps > .08). Highest perceptions of credibility were 
in the numerical condition (M= 3.91, SE= 0.08), and the 
lowest were in the verbal condition (M= 3.63, SE= 0.08). 
Decision to Evacuate 
Mean evacuation ratings for both pre and post-outcome (by 
communication format) are displayed in Table 1, which 
shows little difference between formats both pre and post-
outcome. Indeed, there was no significant effect of outcome 
(p = .07) nor format (p = .20) on the decision to evacuate. 
There was a significant effect of numeracy, F (1, 273) = 5.08, 
p < .05, η𝑝
2= .02, with the high numeracy group more certain 
about evacuating (M= 2.08, SE= 0.10), compared to the low 
numeracy group (M= 2.39, SE= 0.10). There were no 
significant interactions (all ps > .15). 
Correctness Ratings 
Again there was a significant effect of communication format 
on correctness ratings F (3, 273) = 4.90, p < .01, η2p= .05. As 
in Study 1, the numerical format was seen as ‘least incorrect’ 
and the verbal format seen as most incorrect (see Table 1). 
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of Communication Format on Perceptions of 
Credibility Before and After an ‘Erroneous’ Prediction- 
(Error Bars Represent 1−
+ SE) – Study 2 – High Probability. 
General Discussion 
Pre-outcome, people did not perceive any of the 
volcanologists to be more credible than others using different 
communication formats, nor was there an effect of format on 
decision to evacuate. However, post-outcome, credibility was 
sensitive to an ‘erroneous’ prediction, with lower ratings in 
all formats. In Study 1 (low probability), the numerical 
format was affected least by this, and there was a trend for 
numerical-led communications (numerical and N-V) to be 
least affected in Study 2. 
It is surprising that there was no initial difference between 
communication formats on perceptions of credibility in either 
probability domain, given the findings of Longman et al. 
(2012) that an expert who used a point estimate was seen as 
more credible. We would have expected numerical 
communications to have been rated as more credible, as the 
decision to use a precise numerical estimate could be thought 
to reflect a level of confidence and certainty in the prediction. 
Indeed, people expect experts to provide their knowledge in 
a precise manner (Shanteau, 1992).  
In Study 1, the finding of most interest was the presence of 
a format × outcome interaction, whereby the numerical 
format lost least credibility following the occurrence of the 
unlikely event. These findings could be partly attributed to 
the directionality of the expression (Teigen & Brun, 1995, 
1999). Although both V-N and N-V formats featured a 
negatively directional expression (‘unlikely’), it was 
accompanied by the positively directional phrase ‘20% 
likelihood’, which may have cancelled out the effect of the 
negative directionality. Although no significant interaction 
was observed with high probability expressions, the results 
followed a similar trend, with numerical and N-V expressions 
least affected. 
    We were surprised not to replicate Doyle et al.’s (2014) 
findings that more people chose to evacuate when given a risk 
communication featuring a numerical expression as opposed 
to a VPE. Although we found an effect of format in Study 1, 
it was in the opposite direction to the original study. A large 
number of responses to the question of ‘why’ people made 

































 be safe than sorry’. There was little cost to the participant to 
adopt this approach, which could have been a factor in the 
high proportion of people choosing to evacuate immediately. 
Whilst Doyle et al. (2014) attributed their results to the 
ambiguity of VPEs, we argue that our results could also be 
explained using this reasoning. Participants may have felt that 
the choice to use a VPE in the risk communication reflected 
a level of uncertainty in the outcome, with the communicator 
‘hedging their bets’, and thus felt that it was better to adopt a 
conservative stance and evacuate, ‘just in case’. Indeed, this 
is in line with the appropriate response of increased 
uncertainty providing an impetus to be concerned and an even 
greater reason to act (Lewandowsky et al., 2015). 
Additionally, if an ‘unlikely’ event were to occur, it would be 
far more consequential than if a ‘likely’ event did not occur. 
The lack of an influence of numeracy on nearly all of our 
measures was somewhat unexpected, given the fact that 
numeracy has been demonstrated to influence effects of 
communication format (Gurmankin et al., 2004), and 
information format (e.g. frequencies versus percentages, 
Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2010).  
Further research should seek to explore the effect of the 
precision of the communication format. Chess, Hance & 
Sandman (1988) claimed being open about levels of 
uncertainty would lead to enhanced credibility and 
trustworthiness. The current study only explored point 
numerical estimates (e.g. ‘20% likelihood’), rather than more 
specific point estimates (e.g. ‘23% likelihood’). Including 
range estimates (both small and large) would allow for a 
better understanding of the benefits of including numbers in 
risk communications. Whilst Longman et al.’s (2014) 
findings suggest that range estimates will have a negative 
effect on understanding and perceived credibility, others have 
found that range estimates are perceived as more useful and 
more honest (Dieckmann, Mauro, & Slovic, 2010; Johnson & 
Slovic, 1995). 
Conclusion 
This study provides a different perspective to examining the 
effectiveness of risk and uncertainty communications, 
moving away from merely how the information is 
understood. Trust is fundamental to improving these 
communications (Slovic, 1993), and our work contributes to 






The present research provided a systematic comparison of 
the effect of differing communication formats on the 
credibility of the communicator in the context of geological 
risk communications. Identifying instances in which the 
communication format has a significant impact on the 
audience’s perceptions of the communicator is key to 
building and maintaining public trust in science, as well as 
improving the effectiveness of risk communication. Our 
findings show that the numerical format is viewed as more 
correct and is most robust against reductions in credibility 
following an ‘erroneous’ prediction. The present results thus 
suggest numbers should be included in these communications 
wherever possible. 
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